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Abstract—We study moving-target defense (MTD) that ac-
tively perturbs transmission line reactances to thwart stealthy
false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in
a power grid. Prior work on this topic has proposed MTD
based on randomly selected reactance perturbations, but these
perturbations cannot guarantee effective attack detection. To
address the issue, we present formal design criteria to select MTD
reactance perturbations that are truly effective. However, based
on a key optimal power flow (OPF) formulation, we find that
the effective MTD may incur a non-trivial operational cost that
has not hitherto received attention. Accordingly, we characterize
important tradeoffs between the MTD’s detection capability
and its associated required cost. Extensive simulations, using
the MATPOWER simulator and benchmark IEEE bus systems,
verify and illustrate the proposed design approach that for the
first time addresses both key aspects of cost and effectiveness of
the MTD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks against critical infrastructures can lead to
severe disruptions. The December 2015 attack against the
Ukraine’s power grid was a real-world example, which caused
power outages for a large number of customers for hours [1].
These attacks were typically crafted by sophisticated attackers,
sometimes with national backing, who managed to spend
considerable time inside a system to learn its operational
details, and accordingly designed the injection of malicious
data/control to disrupt its operations [2]. It is thus imperative
to design counteracting defense approaches to defeat the
knowledgeable attackers. Moving-target defense (MTD) [3] is
a defense approach that has received increasing attention. It
is based on dynamically changing the system parameters that
attackers need to target for customizing their attacks, in order
to invalidate the attackers’ prior knowledge of the system and
render ineffective any of their prior designed strategies. It has
the potential to make it extremely difficult or impossible for
would-be attackers to keep up with the system dynamics.
In this paper, we focus on false data injection (FDI) attacks
against state estimation (SE) in power grids. SE is a key
method for grid operators to obtain a best estimate of the
system state from noisy sensor measurements collected via
a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system,
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for example. Its output is used in critical applications such as
economic dispatch (for profits) and contingency analysis (for
reliability). A bad data detector (BDD) associated with the
SE is often deployed for identifying bad data (e.g., sensor
anomalies and FDI attacks) to ensure trustworthy results.
However, it has been shown [4] that FDI attacks crafted
using detailed knowledge of a power grid’s topology and the
reactance settings of its transmission lines can bypass the
BDD and remain stealthy. Such an undetected attack can have
severe consequences, e.g., trips of transmission line breakers
or unsafe frequency excursions [5], [6].
To strengthen the BDD, it has been shown that if a carefully
chosen subset of the sensors can be well protected (e.g., by
tamper-proof and encryption-enabled PLCs), or if a key subset
of the state variables can be independently and reliably verified
by phasor measurement units (PMUs) deployed at strategically
chosen locations, then a BDD-bypassing FDI attack becomes
impossible [7], [8], [9]. However, a major revamp of the basic
sensing infrastructure can be quite expensive (e.g., PMU has
high cost [10]) or infeasible for the many existing legacy
systems whose life cycles often last decades and which are not
expected to retire for the foreseeable future. Alternatively, FDI
attacks can be significantly mitigated by MTD that invalidates
the knowledge attackers used for crafting their prior attacks,
specifically by active perturbation of the grid’s transmission
line reactance settings in our application context [11], [12],
[13]. This approach is practical because of current D-FACTS
devices capable of active impedance injection [14]. Because
of their low cost and ease and flexibility of deployment, they
are being increasingly installed in existing alternating-current
(ac) transmission networks to control power flows [15].
Prior work on MTD for FDI attacks against power grid
SE has two important limitations, which are related. First,
the MTD is implemented by selecting a random subset of
transmission lines and introducing similarly random pertur-
bations to their reactance settings [13]. There are no known
conditions for the MTD perturbations to be truly effective. An
important finding of this paper is that the randomly selected
perturbations do not necessarily guarantee effective detection.
Rather, a perturbation must satisfy certain design criteria that
we will make clear (in Section V), or FDI attacks crafted
using (outdated) system knowledge before the perturbation
will remain stealthy after it. Second, without an adequate
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characterization of effective MTD, prior work has not been
able to address explicitly the associated cost involved. Rather,
it is assumed that the MTD can be always constrained to have
negligible or some “low enough” operational cost [13], [11].
However, MTD designed with any absolute cost constraints
will not be useful if the MTD does not perform. It is thus
critical to understand the inherent cost-benefit tradeoff of the
MTD to accordingly inform system operators (SOs) in their
choice of security policies, which is a key objective of this
paper.
To achieve our goal, we analyze the problem of selecting
MTD reactance perturbations that jointly consider their effec-
tiveness (i.e., capability of attack detection) and operational
cost (i.e., economic inefficiency). As in prior work, we assume
that the attacker has learned the system configuration initially
and uses this knowledge to craft stealthy FDI attack vectors,
but the attacker cannot track the reactance perturbations with-
out significant delays. In this setting, large MTD perturbations
will cause the actual system to deviate significantly from
the attacker’s prior knowledge, so that a large majority of
the previously stealthy FDI attacks will now likely become
detectable. Conversely, however, the large perturbations will
also cause the power grid to operate significantly away from
the optimal state, thereby incurring a significantly higher
economic cost. On the other hand, smaller perturbations will
be less expensive, but risk more undetected attacks. The
general cost-benefit tradeoff is thus interesting.
In this paper, we address the cost-benefit tradeoff of the
MTD by formulating its perturbation selection as a constrained
optimization problem, namely minimization of the operational
cost subject to a given effectiveness constraint. The opera-
tional cost is quantified as the increment due to the MTD
over the cost achieved at optimal power flow (OPF) of the
system without MTD. This cost is always non-negative. The
effectiveness is quantified as the fraction of prior stealthy
FDI attacks (i.e., those before the MTD perturbation) that
will become detectable by the BDD after the perturbation.
It is difficult to give an exact analysis of the effectiveness.
We will instead employ a heuristic metric that effectively
invalidates the attacker’s knowledge required to bypass the
BDD. Extensive simulation results show that the heuristic
metric effectively approximates the true metric.
We use a direct-current (dc) power flow model to approx-
imate power flows in an alternating-current (ac) grid. This
approach is widely adopted and well justified in power system
research (e.g., [4], [7], [13]). Under the dc model, the OPF
cost corresponds mainly to the cost of generation dispatch.
Moreover, the sensor measurements are linearly related to the
system state through a measurement matrix, which in turn
depends on the power grid topology and the reactance of the
transmission lines. Naturally, perturbing a branch reactance
will alter the measurement matrix correspondingly. A key
observation in our analysis is that the MTD’s effectiveness
and operational cost are related to the separation between the
column spaces of the measurement matrices before and after
the MTD. While the effectiveness is enhanced by increasing
the separation between the two column spaces, the operational
cost increases. Therefore, different degrees of separation be-
tween the two spaces provide a spectrum of balance between
the two metrics.
We note that, in light of our deliberate cost analysis of the
MTD, the MTD can be viewed as a form of insurance against
possible FDI attacks. Such insurance requires an ongoing
payment of “premiums” irrespective of whether an attack
occurs or not. However, in the event of an attack, which may
be accumulatively extremely expensive if allowed to persist
indefinitely because of lack of detection, the insurance can
provide a much needed hedge against the damage. In actual
deployments, whether to procure such insurance (i.e., turn on
the MTD or not) is likely a matter of diverse factors such
as institutional policies (including the institution’s attitude
towards risk taking), estimated vulnerability to attacks or
likelihood of attacks, and the cost-benefit tradeoff specific to
the power grid in question. This paper sheds light on tradeoffs
in the key technical problem, which serves as an important
reference basis for the other questions. Nevertheless, it does
not attempt to answer all the questions, particularly policy
questions, that are also interesting.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as
follows:
• We derive conditions for an MTD reactance perturbation
to ensure that no FDI attacks crafted based on the out-
dated (pre-perturbation) system configuration will remain
stealthy after the perturbation.
• When the reactance adjustment capability of D-FACTS is
insufficient for achieving the above condition, we present
heuristic design criteria for selecting MTD perturbations
that can still highly likely achieve effective attack detec-
tion.
• We characterize the tradeoff between the MTD’s effec-
tiveness and its operational cost in a constrained opti-
mization framework. Additionally, we present extensive
simulation results using the realistic MATPOWER sim-
ulator for benchmark IEEE bus systems to verify and
illustrate the tradeoff.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews related work. Section III introduces the pre-
liminaries. Section IV explains the attacker and the defender
model. Sections V and VI analyze the MTD’s effectiveness
and its cost-benefit tradeoff. Section VII presents simulation
results. Section VIII concludes. The technical proofs can be
found in Appendices A,B and C.
II. PRIOR WORK
Recent work [4] analyzed the condition for bypassing the
BDD of SE and proposed a technique to construct BDD-
bypassing FDI attacks using complete knowledge of the power
grid topology and the branch reactances. Subsequent research
[16] showed that such attacks can be constructed using partial
knowledge of the power grid topology. However, the knowl-
edge of power grid topology is difficult to obtain in practice.
Recent work [17], [18] showed that BDD-bypassing attacks
can also be crafted using the eavesdropped measurement data
only. The impact of such stealthy FDI attacks on system
efficiency and safety were investigated. In particular, the
economic impact of FDI attacks were studied in [19] and [20].
Reference [6] showed that the attacker can drive the power
system frequency to unsafe levels by injecting a sequence of
carefully-crafted FDI attacks.
To address BDD’s vulnerability, defense mechanisms based
on protecting a strategically-selected set of sensors and their
data links were proposed [7], [8], [9]. The use of generalized
likelihood ratio test was proposed to detect FDI attacks when
the adversary has access to only a few meters in [21].
Reference [22] presented a sparse optimization based approach
to separate nominal power grid states and anomalies.
The concept of MTD was originally proposed for enterprise
networks based on changing the IT features of devices such
as end hosts’ IP addresses and port numbers, the routing
paths between nodes, etc. [23], [24]. More recent work has
proposed MTD in power systems by changing its physical
characteristics [11], [12], [13]. In particular, on-going FDI
attacks can be detected by introducing reactance perturbations
that are known only to the defender (SO) [11], since the
change in sensor measurements (after the perturbations) will
be different from its predicted value based on the power
flow model (due to the attack). It has also been shown that
stealthy FDI attacks can be precluded by actively perturbing
the branch reactances to invalidate the attacker’s knowledge
[13]. We similarly consider MTD for power systems in this
paper. Compared with the prior work, ours is the first to jointly
consider the MTD’s effectiveness and its operational cost. We
provide hitherto unavailable formal design criteria for selecting
effective MTD reactance perturbations, and expose important
tradeoffs between the effectiveness and operational cost.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Power Grid Model
We consider a power network that is characterized by a set
N = {1, . . . , N} of buses, L = {1, . . . , L} of transmission
lines (an example of the 4 bus power system is shown in
Figure 3). The line l ∈ L that connects bus i and bus j is
denoted by l = {i, j}. The time of operation is denoted by
t ∈ R.
At bus i, we denote the power generation and load at time
t by Gi,t and Li,t respectively and the reactance of link l by
xl,t. We adopt the dc power flow model [25], under which the
power flow on line l at time t denoted by Fl,t, is given by
Fl,t =
1
xl,t
(θi,t − θj,t),
where θi,t and θj,t are the voltage phase angles at buses i, j ∈
N respectively at time t. For safe operation, the branch flows
must be maintained within the power flow limits Fmaxk at all
time, i.e.,
−Fmaxk ≤ Fk,t ≤ Fmaxk , ∀t.
The relationship between branch power flows and the voltage
phase angles can be compactly represented as ft = DtATθt,
where the matrix A ∈ RN×L is the branch-bus incidence
matrix given by
Ai,j =

1, if link j starts at bus i,
−1, if link j ends at bus i ,
0 otherwise,
and Dt ∈ RL×L is a diagonal matrix of the reciprocal of link
reactances, i.e.,
Dt = diag
([
1
x1,t
,
1
x2,t
, . . . ,
1
xL,t
])
,
and ft = [F1,t, . . . , FL,t]T (similarly gt, lt,θt denote the
vector forms of the corresponding quantities).
We assume that a subset of the links LD ⊆ L are equipped
with D-FACTS devices, and the reactances of these links can
be changed within the range [xmin,xmax], where xmin,xmax
are the reactance limits achievable by the D-FACTS devices.
Naturally, xminl = x
max
l = xl,t if l /∈ LD. Denote the vector
of branch reactances by xt.
State Estimation & Bad Data Detection Technique
SE is a technique of estimating the system state from
its noisy sensor measurements [25]. Under the dc power
flow model, the state at time t corresponds to the nodal
voltage phase angles θt, which are monitored by a set of
M measurements zt ∈ RM . The measurements correspond
to the nodal power injections, and the forward and reverse
branch power flows, i.e. zt = [p˜t, f˜t,−f˜t]T . We note that the
measurements may be different from the actual values of pt
and ft due to sensor measurement noises or cyber-attacks. The
measurement vector and the state are related as
zt = Htθt + nt,
where nt is the measurement noise, which is assumed to
have Gaussian distribution. Ht ∈ RM×N is the measurement
matrix given by
H =
 DtAT−DtAT
ADtA
T
 .
The estimate of the system state, θ̂t, is computed using a
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation technique, given by
[25],
θ̂t = (H
T
t WHt)
−1HTt Wzt,
where W is a diagonal weighting matrix whose elements are
reciprocals of the variances of the sensor measurement noise.
A BDD is used to detect faulty sensor measurements. It
compares the residual defined by rt = ||zt −Htθ̂t|| against
a pre-defined threshold τ and raises an alarm if rt ≥ τ. The
detection threshold τ is determined by the SO to ensure a
certain false positive (FP) rate α, where α > 0 (usually a
small value close to zero).
Fig. 1: System block diagram.
Undetectable FDI Attacks
We consider FDI attacks against the SE, in which the
attacker injects an attack vector at ∈ RM into the sensor
measurements, i.e., zat = zt+at, where z
a
t is the measurement
vector under an attack. In general, the BDD can detect
arbitrary FDI attack vectors. However, it is demonstrated [4]
that the BDD’s detection probability for attacks of the form
at = Htc, where c ∈ RN , is no greater than the FP rate α.
Such attacks are referred to as undetectable attacks.
Optimal Power Flow Problem
OPF is an optimization framework to adjust the power
flows in the network (by setting the generator dispatch and
the branch reactances) with the objective of minimizing the
generation cost for a given load vector lt ∈ RN , stated as
follows1:
COPF,t = min
gt,xt
∑
i∈N
Ci(Gi,t) (1a)
s.t. gt − lt = Btθt, (1b)
−fmax ≤ ft ≤ fmax, (1c)
gmin ≤ gt ≤ gmax, (1d)
xmin ≤ xt ≤ xmax, (1e)
where Ci(Gi,t) is the cost of generating Gi,t units of power
at node i ∈ N , the matrix Bt = ADtAT . In (1), the first
constraint (1b) represents the nodal power balance constraint,
i.e., the power injected into a node must be equal to the power
flowing out of the node. Constraints (1c)-(1e) correspond to
the branch power flows, generator limits, and D-FACTS limits,
respectively. We denote g∗t ,x
∗
t = arg maxgt,xt OPF. We note
that the OPF cost depends on the branch reactances through
the matrix Bt (in addition to the loads).
IV. MOVING-TARGET DEFENSE IN POWER GRIDS
A. Attacker and the Defender Model
A block diagram of the system under study is shown
in Fig. 1. We consider a strong attacker who has access
to the measurement data communicated between the field
devices and the control center. Such access could be obtained
by exploiting vulnerabilities in power grid communication
1In the absence of D-FACTS devices installed within the grid, OPF
optimizes over the generator dispatch values only (which is the version of
OPF traditionally used [25]).
Pre-perturbation Post-perturbation
Time between MTD
Ht H′t′
Measurement
Matrix
Time
Time between MTD
t t′Time
Fig. 2: MTD timeline. The vertical arrows indicate the times
at which the system is perturbed.
systems. For example, in modern-day power grids, the field
devices (such as remote terminal units) are often IP-accessible
[26]. We also assume that the attacker can learn the system’s
measurement matrix (using the eavesdropped measurements)
and craft undetectable FDI attacks accordingly (e.g., see [17],
[18]).
Under MTD, the defender (e.g., the SO) tries to thwart
the FDI attacks by actively perturbing the transmission line
reactances to invalidate the attacker’s prior knowledge. We
assume that at the time of introducing MTD perturbations,
there are no on-going FDI attacks. Note that the power system
under consideration is naturally dynamic (even without MTD)
since the branch reactances are optimized periodically to
reflect temporal changes in the system load (refer to the OPF
problem in (1)). However, these natural changes are usually
insufficient for effectively negating the attacker’s knowledge.
Thus, the defender deliberately introduces an additional reac-
tance perturbation to ensure the MTD’s detection capability.
The defender implements the MTD reactance perturbations
by sending MTD control commands to the remote D-FACTS
devices in the grid. Unlike the sensor measurements that
support the grid’s normal operation (e.g., extensive SCADA
measurements collected every few seconds), these commands
are much less frequent (e.g., hourly, see the discussion below),
have much more restricted scope (i.e., between the control
center and the set of D-FACTS devices only), and do not
have stringent real-time constraints. Hence, we assume that
it is feasible to encrypt the MTD commands to ensure their
confidentiality.
We note that although the attacker cannot read the MTD
commands directly due to their encryption, in principle he may
still infer the MTD perturbations by monitoring their effects
on the eavesdropped sensor measurements and estimating the
new measurement matrix accordingly. Thus, the secrecy of
the MTD generally decays over time. In practice, however,
the learning will be time consuming since the attacker must
collect an informative sequence of the measurements over a
significant duration of time. In this paper, we assume that the
time interval between the MTD perturbations is sufficiently
small, so that during it the attacker’s gain in knowledge (of
the measurement matrix) is negligible.
A guiding principle to estimate the perturbation time in-
terval can be obtained from [17], in which it is shown that
FDI attacks against an IEEE 14-bus system require about
500−1000 measurements of the system to successfully bypass
the BDD, even if these measurements are assumed to have
G1
Bus 4Bus 1
170 
G2
Bus 2 Bus 3
200 
150  50
Fig. 3: 4 bus system under consideration. The loads are
indicated in MWs.
maximum information diversity in that they are i.i.d. Hence,
if we assume optimistically for the attacker that SCADA
measurements need to be only 5−10 seconds apart to achieve
the information diversity, their result suggests that the time
required by the attacker to learn the system sufficiently well
for stealthy attacks is on the order of a few hours. Accordingly,
hourly MTD perturbations might be realistic for practical
systems. Further, we note that utilities typically solve the OPF
more frequently, i.e., every 5− 10 minutes (whereas we only
need to update the MTD every hour or so). Thus, between the
MTD updates, the OPF will be solved as in (1).
The MTD timeline is illustrated in Fig. 2. We consider two
representative time instants t and t′ at which the reactances
are perturbed for MTD. We denote the branch reactances and
the measurement matrix after applying the MTD perturbations
by x′t′ = [x
′
1,t′ , . . . , x
′
L,t′ ]
T and H′t′ respectively, and the
reactance perturbation vector by ∆xt,t′ = xt − x′t′ . We note
that in the absence of MTD, the branch reactances and the
measurement matrix would be set to xt′ and Ht′ by solving
(1) at time t′.
In the rest of the paper, we address the question of how to
select MTD perturbations that are effective in detecting FDI
attacks crafted based on the outdated (i.e., pre-pertubation)
knowledge, and examine their cost-benefit tradeoff. We use
a′t′ to denote the value of a power system parameter at after
the MTD. E.g., θ′t′ denotes the nodal voltage phase angles
after the MTD. To motivate our inquisition, we now illustrate
an example to show that certain randomly selected MTD
perturbations will remain vulnerable to FDI attacks crafted
with the attacker’s pre-pertubation knowledge of the system.
B. A Motivating Example
We consider the 4-bus example shown in Fig. 3 [27]. For
simplicity, we assume that the system load is fixed (indicated
in Fig. 3) and does not change with time. Furthermore, the pre-
perturbation system state and the reactance settings xt (and
Ht) are adjusted by solving (1). The resulting branch flows,
generation values and OPF cost are listed in Table II. The
attacker is assumed to have learned the pre-perturbation matrix
Ht.
To implement the MTD, we consider four
reactance perturbation vectors respectively given by
∆x
(1)
t,t′ = η[x1, 0, 0, 0]
T , ∆x
(2)
t,t′ = η[0, x2, 0, 0]
T ,∆x
(3)
t,t′ =
r′(1) r′(2) r′(3) r′(4)
Attack 1 2.82 2.87 0 0
Attack 2 0 0 2.87 2.82
TABLE I: BDD residual values.
Line Flow (MWs) Gen. (MWs) Cost($)
Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 4 Gen 1 Gen 2
1.15×
104126.56 173.44 -43.44 -26.56 350 150
TABLE II: Pre-perturbation power flows, generator dispatch
and OPF cost for 4-bus system.
MTD Gen. (MWs) OPF Cost ($)
∆x1 337.37 162.62 1.1626× 104
∆x2 340.51 159.48 1.595× 104
∆x3 348.62 151.37 1.1514× 104
∆x4 345.95 154.02 1.154× 104
TABLE III: Post-perturbation generator dispatch and OPF
cost.
η[0, 0, x3, 0]
T , ∆x
(4)
t,t′ = η[0, 0, 0, x4]
T , where η is the
percentage change in the reactance relative to its initial value.
We assess each of the four MTD perturbations in terms of (i)
attack detection and (ii) operational cost.
For attack detection, we inject an attack of the form a =
Htc into the modified power network (after the MTD), and
examine its BDD residual. For illustration, we consider two
attacks – attack 1 in which c = [0, 1, 1, 1]T and attack 2 in
which c = [0, 0, 0, 1]T – and set η = 0.2. For simplicity,
we ignore measurement noises. The BDD residuals under the
four MTD perturbations are listed in Table I. Note that in
the absence of measurement noise, a non-zero value of the
residual indicates the presence of attack. We observe that for
each of the four perturbations, there exist attack vectors of the
form a = Htc, which continue to bypass the BDD for the
perturbed power network.
We also enlist the post-pertubration OPF cost in Table III.
We observe that the OPF cost increases in each of the
four cases, compared to its pre-perturbation cost, and the
perturbation ∆x3 incurs the least cost.
C. MTD Perturbation Selection Challenges
Based on the above illustrating example, we make the
following conclusions. First, it is evident that a subset of
the attacks of the form a = Htc continue to bypass the
BDD after the MTD. Since the defender does not have prior
knowledge of the actual attack vector (note that c is chosen
by the attacker), he cannot make an informed choice of
which perturbation to adopt. Without such knowledge, the
defender must select the MTD that is capable of detecting
a largest subset of the possible attacks. The second design
criterion is the MTD’s operational cost, i.e., other things being
equal, the defender prefers a least-cost MTD. In the following
sections, we characterize formally the MTD’s effectiveness
and its operational cost, and present a framework for choosing
appropriate MTD perturbations that balance between the two
concerns.
V. MTD’S EFFECTIVENESS OF ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we address the problem of selecting effective
MTD reactance perturbations from an attack detection point
of view. The goal is to select reactance perturbations within
the physical constraints of the D-FACTS devices to effectively
invalidate the attacker’s knowledge for bypassing the BDD.
The section is divided into two parts. In the first part, we
devise a metric to quantify the effectiveness of the MTD. In
the second part, we derive the conditions and propose design
criteria for MTD perturbations to preclude stealthy FDI attacks
in practice.
Henceforth, we use the notation “MTD H′t′” to refer to a
reactance perturbation that changes the measurement matrix
from Ht to H′t′ . We let A denote the set of all attack vectors
of the form a = Htc, i.e.,
A = {a : a = Htc, ||a|| ≤ amax, c ∈ RN}.
For an attack vector a, we let P ′D(a) denote its detection
probability under MTD H′t′ , where P
′
D(a) = P(r′ ≥ τ).
We denote by A′(δ) ⊆ A the subset of attacks in A whose
detection probability under MTD H′t′ is greater than a given
δ ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
A′(δ) = {a : a = Htc, ||a|| ≤ amax, P ′D(a) > δ, c ∈ RN}.
A. Metric to Quantify MTD’s Effectiveness
First, we devise a metric to quantify the MTD’s effective-
ness. Intuitively, an MTD perturbation “A” is more effective
than a perturbation “B” if it can detect more FDI attacks in
the set A with high probability. However, A, a subset in the
n-dimensional space (Rn), has infinitely many attack vectors.
For these sets, the Lebesgue measure generalizes the notion of
length (one-dimensional), area (two-dimensional), or volume
(three-dimensional) to n-dimensions [28]. The effectiveness of
an MTD H′t′ for a given δ ∈ [0, 1], which we denote by η′(δ),
can be quantified as
η′(δ) =
λ(A′(δ))
λ(A) , (2)
where λ(A′(δ)) and λ(A) denote the Lebesgue measures of
the respective sets. Intuitively, η′(δ) represents the ratio of
the number of attack vectors of the form a = Htc whose
detection probability under MTD H′t′ is greater than δ to the
total number of attacks in the set A. Since A′(δ) ⊆ A, 0 ≤
η′(δ) ≤ 1.
Of particular interest are the sets A′(α) and A\A′(α), and
the latter is the set of undetectable attacks under MTD H′t′
(refer to Section III for the definition of undetectable attacks).
An ideal MTD is one that admits no undetectable attacks of
the form a = Htc, i.e., A′(α) = A and η′(α) = 1. In the
following subsection, we derive conditions on the MTD H′t′
that can ensure the property.
B. MTD Admitting No Undetectable Attacks
We start by characterizing the condition for an attack a =
Htc to remain undetectable under MTD H′t′ .
Proposition 1. An attack of the form a = Htc is undetectable
under MTD perturbation H′t′ if it satisfies the condition
rank(H′t′) = rank([H
′
t′ Htc]), where [H
′
t′ Htc] is the
augmented matrix.
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix A.
Intuitively, the proposition implies that an attack vector of the
form a = Htc is undetectable under MTD H′t′ if it lies in
the column spaces of both Ht and H′t′ , since rank(H
′
t′) =
rank([H′t′ Htc]) for the attack vector a = Htc ∈ Col(H′t′).
The result allows us to give conditions for the MTD H′t′
to ensure no undetectable attacks of the form a = Htc. In
particular, to achieve the aforementioned property, MTD H′t′
must be selected such that no attack vector a in the column
space of Ht lies in the column space of H′t′ . The following
theorem states the condition.
Theorem 1. An MTD H′t′ has no undetectable attacks of the
form a = Htc if Col(H′t′) is the orthogonal complement of
Col(Ht). Furthermore, for a given attack vector a, such an
MTD achieves the maximum value of P ′D(a) among all the
possible MTD perturbations.
The proof is presented in Appendix B. The first statement
of this theorem implies that for the MTD H′t′ satisfying the
orthogonality condition, there are no attacks of the form a =
Htc for which P ′D(a) is as low as the FP rate α (in general,
α is chosen by the SO to be a small value). However, this
result does not automatically imply that the attacks will also be
detected with high probability, which is the desired outcome.
But the second statement of Theorem 1 shows that this is
indeed the case, since such an MTD also maximizes P ′D(a)
among all possible MTD perturbations.
From Theorem 1, we conclude that purely from an attack
detection point of view, an MTD perturbation should be se-
lected to achieve the stated orthogonality condition. However,
this may not always be feasible due to practical limitations,
e.g., the D-FACTS devices may only allow the reactances to
be perturbed within a certain range. In these cases, we require
an additional design criterion to select the MTD perturbations,
which is the subject of the following subsection.
C. Heuristic Design Criteria for Selecting MTD Perturbation
Intuitively, if the reactance adjustment capability of D-
FACTS is insufficient to meet the orthogonality condition
of Theorem 1, the MTD perturbation should be selected to
make Col(H′t′) as orthogonal to Col(Ht) as possible within
the constraints of the D-FACTS device. To formalize this
notion, we introduce the concept of principal angle between
subspaces, defined as follows:
Fig. 4: Orientation of Col(H ′t′) with respect to Col(Ht), (a) γ(Ht,H
′
t′) = 0 (perfectly aligned column spaces), (b) 0 ≤
γ(Ht,H
′
t′) ≤ pi/2, and (c) γ(Ht,H′t′) = pi/2 (orthogonal column spaces).
Definition V.1 ([29]). The smallest principal angle (SPA) 0 ≤
θ ≤ pi/2 between the subspaces F ,G ⊆ CN is defined as
cos(θ) = max
u∈F,u∈G
||u||=1,||v||=1
|uHv|.
The SPA generalizes the concept of angle between a pair of
vectors to a pair of n-dimensional subspaces. Let γ(Ht,H′t′)
denote the SPA between Col(Ht) and Col(H′t′). We conjec-
ture that MTD perturbations with a higher value of γ(Ht,H′t′)
are more effective in terms of attack detection. Thus, SPA
can be utilized as a design criterion for selecting good MTD
perturbations.
The conjecture is based upon the following observations. (i)
In Appendix C, we present arguments which suggest that the
attack detection probability P ′D(a) increases as we select MTD
perturbations with higher γ(Ht,H′t′). (ii) In the following, we
give some observations to suggest that the measure of the set of
undetectable attacks decreases by selecting MTD perturbations
with higher γ(Ht,H′t′).
We examine MTD perturbations in two extreme cases as
illustrated in Fig. 4. First, consider MTD H′t′ = (1 + η)Ht,
for which it can be verified that γ(Ht,H′t′) = 0. For such an
MTD, the column spaces of the matrices Ht and H′t′ are per-
fectly aligned. Hence all attacks of the form a = Htc remain
undetectable after the MTD (i.e., A′(α) = ∅ and λ(A′(α)) =
0). Thus, an MTD perturbation with γ(Ht,H′t′) = 0 is the
least effective in detecting FDI attacks. Second, for MTD
H′t′ satisfying the orthogonality condition of Theorem 1, it
can be verified that γ(Ht,H′t′) = pi/2. As shown in the
previous subsection, in this case, A′(α) = A and there are
no undetectable attacks of the form a = Hc.
These arguments suggest that MTD perturbations for which
γ(Ht,H
′
t′) is closer to pi/2 are more effective in detecting FDI
attacks, a trend that is also confirmed by our simulation results
using the IEEE 14-bus system (see Section VII). A natural
follow up question is how to select the reactance perturbation
vector ∆xt,t′ to achieve the aforementioned design criteria.
In the next section, we present an optimization framework to
numerically compute ∆xt,t′ while also considering the MTD’s
operational cost.
VI. MTD’S COST-BENEFIT TRADEOFF
Thus far, we have investigated the MTD from an attack
detection point of view only. In this section, we formally define
the operational cost of MTD in an optimization framework.
MTD Operational Cost
We quantify MTD’s cost in terms of the increase in OPF
cost due to the MTD relative to its value without MTD, i.e.,
CMTD,t′ =
C ′OPF,t′ − COPF,t′
COPF,t′
, (3)
where COPF,t′ is the OPF cost of the system corresponding to
the measurement matrix Ht′ computed using (1) (at time t′),
and C ′OPF,t′ is the OPF cost of the system with MTD (corre-
sponding to the measurement matrix H′t′ ). Note that CMTD,t′
is always non-negative since the additional perturbation due
to MTD will increase the OPF cost.
From (3), we note that CMTD,t′ depends on the separation
between the column spaces of Ht′ and H′t′ . In particular, if
the two matrices are identical, then CMTD,t′ is zero. As the
separation between the column spaces of the two matrices
γ(Ht′ ,H
′
t′) is increased, the power flows within the two
systems and the corresponding generation dispatch will be
different (due to the reactance perturbation). Consequently, the
OPF cost in the system with MTD perturbation will increase.
Our observation is that γ(Ht,H′t′) closely approximates
γ(Ht′ ,H
′
t′). Hence, MTD’s operational cost increases as we
choose perturbations with higher γ(Ht,H′t′). The approxi-
mation can be explained as follows. Recall that Ht and Ht′
differ only due to temporal variations in the system load. Since
the power system load is temporally correlated, the matrices
Ht and Ht′ will not differ significantly and their column
spaces are nearly aligned. Thus, γ(Ht,H′t′) can be used as an
approximate measure of the SPA between the column spaces
of Ht′ and H′t′ . Extensive simulation results driven by real-
world data load traces presented in Section VII confirm the
validity of this approximation.
MTD Tradeoff
Following the above arguments, we note that the defender
faces conflicting objectives. On the one hand, for the MTD to
be effective from an attack detection point of view, the column
spaces of the matrices Ht and H′t′ should be as orthogonal
as possible. On the other hand, the MTD’s operational cost
increases with γ(Ht,H′t′). Thus, there exists a trade-off be-
tween the MTD’s effectiveness and its operational cost. To
balance the two aspects, we formulate the MTD reactance
selection problem as a constrained optimization problem with
the objective of minimizing the operational cost subject to a
constraint on the MTD’s effectiveness. The problem is stated
as:
C ′OPF,t′ = min
g′
t′ ,x
′
t′
∑
i∈N
Ci(G
′
i,t′) (4a)
s.t. γ(Ht,H
′
t′) ≥ γth, (4b)
g′t′ − lt′ = B′t′θ′t′ , (4c)
−fmax ≤ f ′t′ ≤ fmax, (4d)
gmin ≤ g′t′ ≤ gmax, (4e)
xmin ≤ x′t′ ≤ xmax. (4f)
In (4), the SPA between the column spaces of Ht and H′t′
is used as a heuristic metric to approximate the effectiveness
of the attack detection η′(δ) (based on the conjecture stated
in Section V-C). In (4b), we impose a constraint on the
SPA, where γth ∈ [0, pi/2] is a threshold that must be tuned
numerically (see Section VII for more details). Simulation
results show that different values of the threshold γth provide
a spectrum of trade-offs between the MTD’s effectiveness and
its operational cost. We propose to solve (4) numerically using
existing constrained non-linear optimization solvers (e.g., the
fmincon function of MATLAB).
Note that the attacker does not have sufficient information
to solve (4) and thus cannot anticipate the MTD perturbations.
In particular, at time t′, the attacker does not know Ht, since
there is not sufficient time to learn it given the frequency of
perturbations (see the discussion in Sec. IV-A). Hence, the
secrecy of the MTD is satisfied.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to evaluate the
MTD’s effectiveness and its operational cost.
A. Simulation Settings & Methodology
The simulations are carried out in MATLAB. All the
constrained optimization problems involved in the simulations
are solved using the fmincon function of MATLAB with the
MultiStart algorithm.
We perform simulations using the IEEE 14-bus system. The
bus topology is shown in Fig. 5. We obtain its configuration
data from the MATPOWER package [27]. As shown in Fig. 5,
the generators are installed at buses 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and their
parameters are listed in Table IV. We use the linear generation
cost model given by Ci(Gi,t) = ciGi,t. We assume that
D-FACTS devices are installed on 6 branches indexed by
Fig. 5: IEEE 14-bus system. (Figure source: [30])
TABLE IV: Generator parameters.
Gen. bus 1 2 3 6 8
Pmax (MWs) 300 50 30 50 20
ci ($/MWh) 20 30 40 50 35
LD = {1, 5, 9, 11, 17, 19}. The D-FACTS limits are set to
xmin = (1− ηmax)x and xmin = (1 + ηmax)x, where x is the
default values (obtained from the IEEE 14-bus case file) and
ηmax is set to 0.5. Further, the branch flow limits are chosen
to be 160 MWs for link 1, and 60 MWs for all other links of
the power system. The rest of the settings are obtained from
the MATPOWER configuration case file.
B. Simulation Results with Static Load
In the first set of simulations, we assume that the system
load is static (we use default values from the IEEE 14-bus
MATPOWER case file). The pre-perturbation reactances xt
(and Ht) are adjusted by solving (1). The defender designs
MTD H′t′ assuming that the attacker has acquired the knowl-
edge of Ht, and that he injects attacks of the form a = Htc.
Effectiveness of Attack Detection: First, we examine the
MTD’s effectiveness (η′(δ)) for different values of γ(H,H′).
We choose γ(Ht,H′t′) ∈ [0, 0.45] radians in steps of 0.05
radians. For each value of γ(Ht,H′t′), we solve the optimiza-
tion problem (4) by setting γth to the corresponding value,
and evaluate η′(δ) using Monte Carlo simulations as follows.
We consider 1000 attack vectors of the form a = Htc,
where the vector c is chosen as a random vector drawn from
the Gaussian distribution, and scale its magnitude such that
||a||1/||z||1 ≈ 0.08 (the scaling adjusts the magnitude of
attack injections to be relatively small in comparison to the
actual measurements). We then evaluate P ′D(a) for each of
the attack vectors (the details will be presented shortly), and
count the fraction of attack vectors for which P ′D(a) ≥ δ,
for a given value of δ ∈ [0, 1]. For each attack vector, the
detection probability P ′D(a) is computed by generating 1000
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Fig. 6: MTD effectiveness for different values of γ(Ht,H′t′) (radians). FP rate is set to 5× 10−4.
instantiations of measurement noise (according to the Gaussian
distribution), and counting the number of times the BDD alarm
is triggered. The BDD threshold is adjusted such that the FP
rate is set to 5× 10−4. We note that MTD does not alter the
FP rate of the BDD.
In Fig. 6 (a), we plot the variation of η′(δ) as a function
of γ(Ht,H′t′) for different values of δ. In this figure, the y-
axis represents the fraction of attacks for which P ′D(a) ≥ δ,
for a given γ(Ht,H′t′). We observe that η
′(δ) monotonically
increases with γ(Ht,H′t′), thus confirming our intuition that
MTD perturbations with higher values of γ(Ht,H′t′) are more
effective in attack detection. E.g., for γ = 0.44, 97% of the
attacks have a detection probability greater than 0.95. In prac-
tice, the defender can run these simulations to determine an
appropriate γth for meeting a desired level of attack detection.
Comparison With Existing Work: We also perform simu-
lations to compare our MTD selection approach with state
of the art [11], [12], [13]. Similar to the related work, we
implement MTD by selecting random MTD perturbations that
are constrained to be within 2% of the optimal value. We
plot η′(δ) as a function of δ for five such randomly-chosen
perturbations in Fig. 7. It can be seen that η′(δ) exhibits high
variability across the trials, implying that the randomly chosen
MTD perturbations cannot always guarantee effective attack
detection.
Further, out of 500 such randomly chosen perturbations
(known also as the keyspace [11], [12]), we count the fraction
of perturbations which satisfy η′(δ) ≥ 0.9 for different
values of δ, and plot the results in Fig. 8. We observe that
less 10% of the randomly-selected MTD perturbations satisfy
η′(0.9) ≥ 0.9. In contrast, the MTD perturbations chosen
according to our approach can always guarantee a certain
effectiveness, once the subspace angle threshold γth is adjusted
to an appropriate value. This highlights the importance of
designing the MTD according to the formal design criterion
advanced in this work.
To show the scalability of the proposed approach to larger
bus systems, we plot the η′(δ) as a function of γ(Ht,H′t′) for
the IEEE 30-bus system in Fig. 6 (b). We use default settings
provided in the MATPOWER case file. We observe results
similar to those for the IEEE 14-bus system, i.e., perturbations
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Fig. 7: MTD effectiveness under five randomly chosen MTD
perturbations in IEEE 14-bus system. FP rate is set to 5×10−4.
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satisfy η′(δ) ≥ 0.9.
which have a higher value of γ(Ht,H′t′) are more effective
in terms of attack detection.
C. Simulation Results With Dynamic Load
In the next set of simulations, we consider dynamic load.
We use a load data trace from New York state for one day
(25-JAN-2016) [31] sampled hourly, and feed it to the IEEE
14-bus system. The simulations are performed every hour. At
each hour, COPF,t is computed by solving (1) with the load
input of the corresponding hour. On the other hand, C ′OPF,t′ is
computed by solving (4) assuming that the attacker’s knowl-
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Fig. 9: Tradeoff between MTD’s effectiveness and operational
cost in IEEE 14-bus system. The data corresponds to 6 PM.
edge is outdated by 1 hour. For example, while computing the
MTD H′t′ at 9 AM, we assume that the attacker has acquired
the knowledge of the measurement matrix Ht at 8 AM. (Recall
from our previous discussion in Sec. IV-A that hourly MTD
perturbations are realistic for practical systems.)
MTD Tradeoff: In Fig. 9, we plot of the tradeoff between
η′(δ) and the operational cost for data corresponding to 6 PM.
We make the following observations. For low values of η′(δ),
the operational cost is nearly zero. However, as γ(Ht,H′t′)
and consequently η′(δ) is increased, the MTD incurs a non-
trivial operational cost. In particular, the cost increases steeply
for values of η′(δ) very close to 1. E.g., for δ = 0.9, an
increase in the value of η′(δ) from 0.8 to 0.9 changes the MTD
operational cost from 0.96% to 2.31%. These results suggest
that the defender must carefully choose an appropriate level
of attack detection while taking into account the increase in
operational cost.
MTD Operational Cost Over a Day: We also perform
simulations to show how the cost varies over the day. At each
hour, we adjust the subspace angle threshold γth numerically
such that the MTD perturbation achieves effectiveness of
η′(0.9) ≥ 0.9. The corresponding value of γ(Ht′ ,H′t′) is
shown in Fig. 11. The rest of the bus settings is identical
to the previous simulation. The variation of MTD operational
cost and the aggregate load are shown in Fig. 10. It can be
observed that the MTD operational cost increases at higher
load. This can be explained as follows. When the system load
is low, there will be a significant buffer capacity between the
branch power flows and the corresponding flow limits. If the
difference in power flows between the two systems (with and
without MTD) is within the buffer capacity, then the generator
dispatch in the two systems will be identical (or close to each
other). Thus, the corresponding MTD cost is low. At higher
loads, the power system is significantly congested, and the
branch power flows of the two systems (with and without
MTD) will differ significantly. Consequently the generator
dispatch in the two systems will be different leading to an
increase in the OPF cost.
We also plot the quantities γ(Ht,Ht′) and γ(Ht′ ,H′t′) for
every hour in Fig. 11. We observe that γ(Ht,Ht′) is nearly
zero for all the simulation instants. This is because the matrices
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Fig. 10: MTD operational cost over a day computed using
New York state hourly load data trace (25-JAN-2016).
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Fig. 11: Smallest principal angle (in radians) between pre-
perturbation and post-perturbation measurement matrices.
Ht and Ht′ do not differ significantly due to the temporal
correlation of the system load between different simulation in-
stants and their column spaces are nearly aligned. These results
also validate the approximation γ(Ht,H′t′) ≈ γ(Ht′ ,H′t′).
D. Discussion
To put the MTD operational cost in perspective, we can
compare it against the potential cost of damage due to a
BDD-bypassing attack. For example, prior work [5], [20]
suggests that such an attack can increase the OPF cost by
up to 28%, and additionally cause transmission line trips
(considering IEEE 14-bus system with similar simulation
settings). Our numbers suggest that the MTD’s operational cost
is comparatively significantly smaller. In practice, based on
its own deployment scenario and other factors like estimated
likelihood of attacks, the SO can make similar comparisons to
assess the merits of adopting the MTD defense.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We addressed the problem of selecting MTD reactance
perturbations that are truly effective in thwarting stealthy FDI
attacks against SE in power grids. We devised a novel metric
to quantify the MTD’s effectiveness, and identified key design
criteria to compute effective MTD perturbations in practice.
We also showed that the effective MTD may incur a non-
trivial operational cost, and provided analysis to expose the
cost-benefit tradeoff of the MTD in an OPF framework. Our
result offers MTD to system operators as an insurance against
possible FDI attacks, and minimizes the cost of such insurance
subject to an effectiveness constraint.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To simplify notation, in this appendix, we drop the time
subscripts t and t′ from the relevant quantities.
A sketch of the proof is as follows. First, we express the
residual r′ as the sum of two components, a noise component
r′n and an attack component r
′
a, given by r
′ = ||r′n + r′a||.
We then show that for attacks that satisfy the condition of
Proposition 1, r′a = 0, and hence their detection probability
is no greater than the FP rate.
We proceed with the first step of the proof. Recall the
expression of r′ = ||z′ −H′θ̂′||, where z′ = H′θ′ + n + Hc,
θ̂′ = (H′TWH′)−1H′TWz′. It can be simplified as
r′ = ||z′ −H′(H′TWH′)−1H′TWz′||
= ||H′θ′ + n + Hc
−H′(H′TWH′)−1H′TW(H′θ′ + n + Hc)||
= ||(I− Γ′)n + (I− Γ′)Hc||, (5)
where Γ′ = H′(H′TWH′)−1H′TW. We note that r′ consists
of two components, a noise component r′n
4
= (I− Γ′)n, and
an attack component r′a
4
= (I − Γ′)Hc. If r′a = 0, then the
detection probability of a is no greater than the FP rate α, and
hence, the attack is undetectable under the MTD perturbation
H′. Note that for all the attacks a = Hc ∈ Col(H′), r′a = 0.
In other words, the system of equations Hc = H′c′ must be
consistent, for some c′ ∈ RN . This condition holds true if and
only if rank(H′) = rank([H′ Hc]) [32].
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A sketch of the proof is as follows. We prove the first
statement by showing that for an MTD H′ satisfying the
orthogonality condition, r′a = 0 if an only if c = 0. Thus it
follows that there are no non-zero attacks that are undetectable
under such an MTD. To prove the second statement, we show
that P ′D(a) increases as we increase ||r′a||. Furthermore, we
show that ||r′a|| achieves its maximum value under the MTD
perturbation that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.
We begin with the proof of the first statement of Theorem 1.
If Col(H′) is the orthogonal complement of Col(H), then
H′TWHc = 0, ∀c ∈ RN , since Hc ∈ Col(H). In this case,
r′a becomes
r′a = Hc−H′(H′TWH′)−1H′TWHc = Hc.
Recall that an attack is undetectable if r′a = 0. For MTD
H′ that satisfies the orthogonality condition, substituting for
r′a from (6), we have that Hc = 0. Since H is a full rank
matrix, the set of equations Hc = 0 has a unique solution
c = 0 [32]. Hence, there are no non-zero undetectable attacks
of the form a = Hc.
Next, we prove the second statement of Theorem 1. First,
note that under any MTD H′, ||r′a|| can be bounded as 0 ≤
||r′a|| ≤ ||a||. The lower bound is true in a straightforward
manner. The upper bound follows from
||r′a|| = ||(I− Γ′)a|| ≤ ||(I− Γ′)|| ||a|| = ||a||, (6)
where the last equality is due to the fact that I − Γ′ is a
projection matrix and hence has unit norm. Furthermore, under
any MTD H′, r′ = ||r′n+r′a|| follows a noncentral chi-square
distribution [33] with its noncentrality parameter equal to ||r′a||
(since r′n + r
′
a is a Gaussian random variable with r
′
a as its
mean).
For a non-central chi-square distributed random variable X ,
P(X ≥ τ) increases by increasing the noncentrality parameter.
Hence, we can conclude that the quantity P ′D(a) = P(r′ ≥
τ) increases by increasing ||r′a||. For an attack vector a, the
quantity ||r′a|| depends on the choice of MTD H′. Thus, we
can conclude that MTD perturbations that yield a greater value
of ||r′a|| can detect the attack vector a with higher probability
(i.e., P ′D(a) is higher).
In particular, for MTD H′ that satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 1, from (6), we note that ||r′a|| = ||a||, which is
also the maximum value of ||r′a||. Therefore, such an MTD
achieves the maximum possible value of P ′D(a).
APPENDIX C: CONJECTURE OF SECTION 5.3
In this appendix, we present arguments that the attack
detection probability P ′D(a) increases as we select MTD
perturbations with higher γ(H,H′). We use the short-hand
notation f(u,v) to represent the quantity max
u∈F,u∈G
||u||=1,||v||=1
|uHv|.
The conjecture can be argued by examining the dependence
of ||r′a|| on γ(H,H′) in the following three cases:
• Case 1: When Col(H′) is the orthogonal complement
of Col(H), we have that f(u,v) = 0 (since uHv =
0, ∀u ∈ Col(H),v ∈ Col(H′)), and γ(H,H′) =
cos−1(0) = pi/2. From the arguments in Appendix B,
recall that in this case, ||r′a|| = ||a||.
• Case 2: When Col(H) and Col(H′) are identical (e.g.
when H′ = (1 + η)H), we have that f(u,v) = 1, and
γ(H,H′) = cos−1(1) = 0. In this case, after straightfor-
ward simplification, it can be shown that ||r′a|| = 0.
• Case 3: For 0 ≤ γ ≤ pi/2, from reference [16], we have
the following bound
||r′a|| ≤ sin(γ(H,H′))||a||. (7)
Note that the bound of (7) increases as γ(H,H′) in-
creases, which suggests that ||r′a|| also increases.
The conjecture can be justified from the observation in these
three cases and using the fact that P ′D(a) increases as ||r′a||
increases (Appendix B).
